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MOTION
No. 70-283 OT 1971
Adams v. Williams
This is a motion filed by the District Attorney of NY
County

to be allowed to argue as amicus for 20 minutes. I

have attached the cert memo in this case to remind you of the
issues in this search and seizure case.

Rule 44 of this Court

says that such requests, unless filed by the SG or a State,
"are not favored."

I see nothing in the request which con-

vinces me that this request to argue orally should be granted.
The points he wishes to make can be made effectively in an
amicus brief.
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Resp. was convicted in a Conn. state TC of (1) possession of a
firearm, (2) possession of heroin, and (3) possession of a weapon
in his motor vehicle.

After losing on appeal in the state courts,

Resp filed a habeas corpus petition in the USDC D Conn.

His sole

claim was that evidence used against him in the state court (hand gun,
-----~-·

...

heroin, and a machete) was seized in violation of the 4th Amendment.

-- --

The USDC denied the petition and the CA 2 aff'd (Danaher & Hays;
Friendly dissenting).

However, the case was then reviewed by >_··

the CA 2 en bane and reversed with Judge Hays dissenting.

The State

subsequently applied for cert. from this Court.

--

The undisputed facts upon which the en bane opinion relies are
as follows.

While walking his rounds in Bridgeport, Conn. at 2a00 a.m.p

a police officer was told by an informer that a man (Resp), who was
c:. a.. t- -

-···--

-

-

seated in a parke~across the streetp had a gun tucked into his
waistband and narcotics on his person. The officer knew the informer
since he had on one prior occasion supplied information in an unrelated
matter.

On the basis of the informer's statement the officer decided

to investigate further.
get out.

He approached the car and asked Resp to

Resp rolled down the window and the officer immediately

reached in and grabbed the gun from Resp's waistband.

After ordering

Resp from the car, the officer searched him and found the heroin; he
also discovered the machete under the seat in the car.
The 4th Amendment issue raised by this factual circumstance
t-Jre.
.
f ocuses onAquest1on whether the police officer had the right .~o
approach Resp and forcibly detain him.

Under conventional search-and-

seizure law the State has sought to justify the officer's conduct on

I

either of two theories.

First, it was contended below that the

officer had probable cause to believe that Resp was committing a
~-I uJ.
crime (possessing narcotics and a weapon). The officer's only ~~
information was the statement of the informer.

vv-r~-r

In the absence of ,

.A-'~ f.

~~
either independent corroboration of the informant's story or a ~
~
greater history of the informant's proven reliability in reporting
other similar cttiminal activity,

this information provided the

officer with an insufficient basis for an arrest.

A number of this

Court's precedents dealing with probable cause where the officer
Spinelli v.

------------------

United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964); Draper v. United Stateso 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

The CA 2

en bane opinion cites these cases as controlling and, indeed, the
State appears to have abandoned this claim in their cert petition.
The second possible justification for the officer's conduct,
~~~----~~~----

and the only one that is seriously at issue at this point, is the
rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969).

In Terry the Court

held that police officers could approach and detain briefly persons
whom the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe are engaged in
criminal activity.

~

-

Pursuant to such a "stop," the officer may

conduct a limited "frisk" for weapons if he has a reasonable basis

-

__.....,

for believing that the person might be armed.

The facts of this case

would appear to fall directly within the Terry rule.
~

The officer,

on the basis of what the informer told him, certainly had reasonable
suspicion that Resp was engaged in criminal activity.

Clearly, the

responsible course for him to pursue was to approach Resp and explore
the circumstances further.

r

And, having solid reason to believe that
.r

Resp was armed, it was quite appropriate for him to reach into the
waistband and remove
f

l

~he

weapon.

The 3-judge panel opinion relied

entirely on Terry. The en bane Per Curiam, however, rejects the
Terry reasoning in a single sentencea

"We conclude that on the basis of the facts then known
to him, (the officer) had neither probable cause to arrest
(Resp) nor any other sufficient cause for reaching into (Resp's)
waistband • • • • : See Terry v, Ohio."
The CA tells us nothing in further explanation as to why this case
is not squarely governed by Terry but J. Friendly's dissent to the

----

panel opinion provides two poss.ible explanations.
I r

________..-

. :fY./ a~s
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~

~~

~
~~

at length that Terry

d~

First, Friendly
......__

\ '-.

to "crimes of possession."

In his view, an officer is justified in detaining and questioning
persons whom he believes are about to commit, or have just committed,
some violent crime (such as robbery, assault, etc).

On the other

hand, he contends that an officer is not justified in detaining
persons whom he believes are merely committing possessory crimes
( o.ch as possession of we,apons or drugs).

~~top and
~ crime of

frisk someone whom he believes to be committing solely the

possessing a weapon, Friendly contends, constitutes a

search and seizure on less than probable
proscribed by the 4th Amendment.
to s· '?

To allow an officer to

cause-~an

act clearly

Furthermore, to allow an officer

Cg stop a heroin addict and conduct a protective patdown

for weapons Friendly finds objectional because such a search is
frequently likely to uncover evidence of drug possession, i.e.
he fears that patdowns for weapons would be pretextual

sea~ches

for narcotics in cases where probable cause to believe that the
person is possessing narcotics is lacking.

The Court's opinion

in Terry does not on its face support such a distinction but it is
true that the facts in that case involve suspicion of a robbery and
not a mere possessory offense.
The second possible explanation for the en bane opinion's terse
disposition of Terry rises out of a serious factual problem.

Judge

Friendly points out that at the first suppression hearing in the
state court the officer testified and made no mention of the informer.

ct

Rather, the officer testified that he was in a radio car and responed
to a police signal to go to the Williams car.

Not until the

"

second hearing did the officer tell the story about the informer.
The identity of the informer was never disclosed despite the defendant's
repeated requests.

As Friendly points out, appellate courts are

bound by the supported findings of fact of the state trial court
and that

c~urt

did believe the officer's second story. I believe,
~---------------------------however, that Friendly and the majority of the full court were
seriously troubled by this total change of stories by the officer
and the absence of corroboration which the informer, had he been
made available, could have provided.
I am inclined to recommend that this case be granted in order
for the Court to consider the applicability of ·Terry to this type
of factual pattern.

I am strongly persuaded that the officer, if

his story is to be believed, did nothing unreasonbale and that
Terry should be held to cover the crime of illegal possession of
a hand gun.

Police officers who have reasonable grounds to

~

suspect that a person is armed (especially in an urban community
late at night) should have the power to approach him and question
him to determine whether he has a license and why he is carrying
the weapon.

Certainly, also, he should disarm that person prior

to any discussion.

Nevertheless, significant ' Supreme Court opinions

ought not be delivered in cases in which the facts are tainted with
the possibility of fabrication.

I would therefore suggest that,if

you believe the case otherwise cert-worthy, prior to voting on the
petition at conference you should direct the clerk's office to
~

call for the complete transcript in order to ascertain whether the
officer's apparently contradictory stories can be reconciled.
CALL FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH A VIEW TO GRANT
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DISCUSS

Adams v. Williams
Cert to CA 2

This is a motion filed by the ACLU to file a brief
amicus in the above named case, which will probably

-........_

be argued next Term.

This is the case raising the 4th

Amendment question about the propriety of a nighttime
search of the occupant of a car--should Terry apply to
possessory crimes.
The case raises an important 4th Amendment question.
The motion should be granted.
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BENCH MEMO
No. 70-283 ADAMS v. WILLIAMS
Larry's cert memo in this case is entirely adequate as a "bench memo".
I have now read the entire appendix, including the findings of fact
by the Connecticut state trial court, the evidence at the state suppression
hearing, the opinion of the U.S. District Court on the habeas corpus petition
(the District Court Judge accepting the state court's findings of fact), the
opinion of CA 2 en bane, with Judge Hays' dissenting opinion.
I have also reread Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, which seems to me to
be controlling.
A good summary of the facts is found in the

district~

court's

opinion - Appendix 52. In a sentence, a police officer in a high crime district
at 2:15 a. m. , on the basis of a tip from an informer known to be reliable by
the officer frisked a man sitting in a car, finding a gun in his waistband.
Probable cause was not necessary under these circumstances.

Terry v. Ohio.

Argued 4/10/72
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 1, 1972

Re:

No. 70-283 -Adams v. Williams

Dear Bill:
Please join me .
Sincerely,

;+Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference

~tt.pl·tmc <q~11trt

of tire Jl.Tnitcb .§tatcs

21JasJrington, p. (!f. 2J.lbi>t;J
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 1, 1972

70-283 - Adams v. Williams
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in this
case, with twc suggestions:
( 1) I would hope that you might consider deleting
the first two complete sentences on page 6. I think they do
not really add anything to the probable cause finding, and,
indeed, even detract from it.
(2) I suggest that the citation of Chimel v. Cali-

fornia be deleted at the bottom of page 6, and that there be
substituted therefor citations to Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160.
My reasons for this suggestion are twofold. First, it is my
recollection that the search in this case occurred before the
Chimel decision, and we have held that that decision is not
retroactive. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797; Williams
v. United States, 401 U.S. 646. Secondly, I doubt whether
Chimel (which involved an unlawful search of a man's house)
w::mld, in any event, be an apposite authority for the lawfulness of the automobile search in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

of tltt 'Jllttitclt ~ttttt~
~lUllfi:ttgtott. 1(}. ~· 2!l,?J!.~

..§u.prtm:t

~omt

CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 2, 1972

Re:

No. 70-283

-

Adams v. Williams

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

i
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc: The Conference

{i.

rJ.

~nvrtutt (!JtltWt 41f tlrl'~nitrb ~tnttn

~t~ct£t~itt~hnt,

JD. <q.

Ct1AMBERS OF

JUSTICE: WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

:W.Gn~

June third
1972

Dear Thurgood:
Re:

No. 70-283 - Adams v. Williams

Please join me in your dissent
circulated June second.

Mr. Justice Marshall
CC:

The Conference

;§JtFttnt Qf4tltrlttf tltt 1!tttittb ~tatt.a

~M!p:n:ghm. ~. Qf. Wbi)}~
CHAMBERS 0,.

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 5, .

Re:

70-283 - Adams v. Williams

Dear Potter:
Thank you for the suggestions in your memorandum of
June 1.

Each of your points will be reflected in the next

circulation of the proposed opinion.
Sincerely, ; /

, (1

VV ·
Mr. Jus t ice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

.§u.vumt <.qcurt of trrt 'Jllni:ttb j)tahs
'ma:s!littgtolt, tn. <.q.

Zllbi'l>~

CHAMBERS Of'

June 5, 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 70-283 - Adams v. Williams

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,~

T.M.

Mr. Justice Douglas
cc:

Conference

.;§np-rtmt C!f~ud ~f tlfe ~trite~ .:§Utttg
~agfrittgttm.!B. <!f. 2ll~'!-.;t

June 6, 1972

CHAMBERS OF'

- r HE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

No. 70-283 -- Adams v. Williams

Dear Bill:
Please join me.

Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

June 7, 1972

Re: No. 70-283 Adams v. Williams

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
,l:l·,

1 '·

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc: The Conference

6/7/72--LAH
Res

Adams v. Williams, No.

70~283

Judge a

p

(

Attached are the followings (1) Justice Rehnquist's
first draft of a majority opinion in this search-and-seizure case; (2) Justice Marshall's dissent; (3) Justice
Brennan's dissent; (4) Justice Douglas' dissent; (5)
joining notes from the CJp WHite, Stewart, Blackmun.
Rehnquist's opinion is acceptable and I recommend that
you join it.

I am troubled about the case because he did

not meet headon the problem

ra~sed

and discussed at

length in the Second Circuit--namely whether Terry v. Ohio
applies to possessory offenses.
concludes that it does.
~

Tacitly, now, this Court

This is a major extension of

Terry, and although it is a step which I view as proper and
indeed almost inevitable, I am disappointed that the Court
does n0t meet it with more assurance and force.

The

dissenters are justified in their concern that Terry, which
was initially designed to be a narrow and refined exception
to the otherwise ironclad warrant rule, has been enlarged
almost by fiat.

Nonetheless, I see no benefit in your

writing separately.

As you have pointed out, no opinion

fully suits everyone and if we wrote in every case that
we find troublesome the Term would never end.
Other than dodging the tough issue, I think the majority
opinion is well written and thorough in its treatment of the
matters it touches.
The three dissents add nothing which should cause you
to change your vote.

(Justice Douglas' dissent is worth

reading because it is amusing in that it bears no relation

--2-to the case before the Court.

Indeed, I suspect that you

will find his statements on gun control and the breadth
of gmvernment power to regulate in this area

most acceptable.

If those remarks were made in a case before the Court I
would ask you to join him.)
JOIN JUSTICE REHNQUIST

LAH

I

~ ~
·

~

~~
:S: N
~
~

"'t~
~~
...

p..;
~

...i

~

r:tJ.

s

.~

}

~
P=1

:)

E-<

:s:
~
~

•
~

-'
..;;

>

~

r:tJ.

s
"t::

~
.

•.-4

:::

~"-J~~
'Z

~

~

.......
.......

<

\

~~
..::s-~

M

co

~

N

I

0

t-

.:)

t

).

'l~,
o!3 ""'
-..
-

I

To: The Chief Justice

Kr. Justice Douglas
Kr. Justice Brennan
Kr. Justice Stewart
Kr. Justice White
Kr. Justice MarRhall
Kr _J.wrtioe Blackmun

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

~tioePowe~
ST~ Rehnquist, J.

No. 70--283

Recirculated: _____________
Frederick E. Adams, Warden, On Writ of Certiorari to
Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Robert Williams.
rJune - , 1972]

MR. Jl:STICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Respondent Robert Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of illegal possession of a handgun
found during a "stop and frisk ," as well as possession
of heroin that was found during a full search incidental
to his weapons arrest. After respondent's conviction
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 157
Conn. 114, 249 A. 2d 245 ( 1968), this Court denied
certiorari. 395 U. S. 927 ( 1969). Williams' petition
for federal habeas corpus relief was denied by the District Court and by a divided panel of the Second Circuit,
436 F. 2d 30 (1970), but on rehearing en bane the Court
of Appeals granted relief. 441 F. 2d 394 (1971). That
court held that evidence introduced at Williams' trial
had been obtained by an unlawful search of his person
and car, and thus the state court judgments of conviction should be set aside. Since we co11clude that the
policeman's actions here conformed to the standards
this Court laid down in Terry Y. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1068).
we reverse.
Police Sgt. John Connolly was alone early in the
morning on car patrol duty in a high crime area of
Bridgeport, Connecticut. At approximately 2:15 a.m.

70-283-0PINION
2

ADA:\18 v.

WILLIA~lS

a person known to Sgt. Connolly approached his cruiser
and informed him that an individual seated in a nearby
vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his
waist.
After calling for assistance on his car radio, Sgt. Connolly approached the vehicle to investigate the informant's report. Connolly tapped on the car window and
asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door.
When Williams rolled down the window instead, the sergeant reached into the car and removed a fully loaded
revolver from Williams' waistband. The gun had not
been visible to Connolly from outside the car, but it was
in precisely the place indicated by the informant. Williams was then arrested by Connolly for unlawful possession of the pistol. A search incident to that arrest was
conducted after other officers arrived. They found substantial quantities of heroin on Williams' person and
in the car, :mel they found a machete and a second
revolver hidden in the automobile.
Respondent contends that the initial seizure of his
pistol, upon which rested the later search and seizure
of other weapons and narcotics, was not .i ustified by
the informant's tip to Sgt. Connolly. He claims that
absent a more reliable informant, or some corroboration
of the tip, the policeman's actions '"ere unreasonable
under the standards set forth in Terry Y. Ohio, supra.
In Terry this Court recognized that "a police officer
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for the pmpose of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest." 392 U. S., at 22.
The Fomth Amendment does not require a policeman
who lacks the precise level of information necessary
for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders
and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On
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the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence
of good police work to adopt an intermediate response.
See id., at 23. A brief stop of a suspicious individual,
in order to determine his identity or to maintain the
status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known
to the officer at the time. Id., at 21-22; sec Gaines v.
Craven, 448 F. 2d 1236 (CA9 1971); United States v.
Unverzagt, 424 F. 2d 396 (CAS 1070).
The Court recognized in Terry that the policeman
making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be
denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack
by a hostile suspect. "When an officer is justified in
believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior
he is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others," he may conduct
a limited protective search for concealed weapons. Id.,
at 24. The purpose of this limited search is not to
discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence, and
thus the frisk for weapons might be equally necessary
and reasonable "·hether or not carrying a concealed
weapon violated any applicable state la\Y. So long as
the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop ' and has
reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dan-gerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in
scope to this protective purpose. I d., at 30.
Applying these principles to the present case we believe that Sgt. Conno1ly acted justifiably in responding
to his informant's tip. The informant was known to
him personally and had provided him with information
in the past. Unlike the situation that obtains in the
1
The State doc~ not contend that Williams acted voluntarily in
rolling down the window of his car.
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case of an anonymous telephone tip, for example, the
informer here came forward personally to give infonnation that was immediately verifiable at the scene. Indeed, under Connecticut law, the informer herself might
have been subject to immediate arrest for making a
false complaint had Sgt. Connolly's investigation proven
the tip incorrect. 2 Thus, while the Court's decisions
indicate that this informant's unverified tip may have
been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, see, e. g., Spinelli Y. United States, 393 U. f3. 410
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify
the officer's forcible stop of Williams.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject respondent's
argument that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk
can only be based on the officer's personal observation,
rather than on information supplied by another person.
Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary grea.tly in
their value and reliability. One simple rule will not
cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking
in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police
response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in
some situations-for example, when the victim of a
street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a
description of his assailant, or when a credible informer
warns of a specific impending crime-the subtleties of the
hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police
response.
While properly investigating the activity of a person
who was reported to be carrying narcotics and a con~Section 53-168 of the Connecticut General Statutes, in force at
the time of these eYents, providrd that a "person who knowingly
makes to any police officer ... a false report or a false complaint
alleging that a crime or crime~ ha\'C been committed" is guilty of
a misdemeanor.
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cealed weapon and who "·as sitting alone in a car in a
high crime area at 2: 15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly
had ample reason to fear for his safety. 3 When Williams
rolled down his "·inclow, rather than complying with
the policeman's request to step out of the car so that
his movements could more easily be seen, the revolver
allegedly at Williams' waist became an even greater
threat. Under these circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought
to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed
to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was reasonable. The loaded gun sei~ed as a re,s ult of this intrusion was therefore admissible at Williams' trial. Terry
v. Ohio, supra, at 30.
Once Sgt. Connolly had found the gun precisely where·
the informant had predicted, probable cause existed to
arrest Williams for unlawful possession of the weapon.
Probable cause to arrest depends "upon whether, at the
moment the arrest was made ... the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and'
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [suspect] had committed or was committing
an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (1964) ..
In the present case the policeman found Williams in
possession of a gun in precisely the place predicted by
the informant. This tended to corroborate the reliability of the informer's further report of narcotics, and
Figures reported by the Federau Bureau of Investigation indicnte that 125 policrmrn were murdered in 1971, with all but five
of them having been killed by gunshot wounds. Federal Bureau of
Innstigalion Law Enforcement Bulletin, February 1972, p. 33.
According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a su~pect scat eel in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical EYaluation,
54 J. Cri.m. L. C. & P . S. 93 (1963).
8
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together with the surrounding circumstances certainly
suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the
gun. It is true, as respondent points out, that gun
possession is legal in Connecticut if the individual has
a permit. But nothing occurred in the course of Sgt.
Connolly's encounter with Williams to suggest that Williams might have such a permit, and it is undisputed, of
course, that he did not in fact have one. Probable
cause does not require the same type of specific evidence
of each element of the offense as would be Heeded to
support a conviction. See Draper v. United States,
358 U. S. 307, 311-312 (1959). Rather, the court will
evaluate generally the circumstances at the time of
the arrest to decide if the officer had probable cause for
his action:
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they arc the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men , not legal technicians.
act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175
(1949).
See also id., at 177. Under the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of the gun seized by Sgt. Connolly, the arrest on the weapons charge was supported
by probable cause, and the search of his person and of
the car incident to that arrest was lawful. Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752, 763 (1969). The fruits of the
search were therefore properly admitted at Williams'
trial, and the Court of Appeals erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.
Reversed.

